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Abstract 
In this paper, we propose a Fail-Stop Group Signature Scheme (FSGSS). FSGSS 
combines the features of the Group Signature and the Fail-Stop Signature to enhance 
the security level of the original Group Signature. Assuming that the FSGSS 
encounters an attack by a hacker armed with a supercomputer, this scheme can prove 
that the digital signature is indeed forged. Based on the above objectives, this paper 
proposes three lemmas and proves that they are indeed feasible. First, how does a 
recipient of a digitally signed document verify the authenticity of the signature? 
Second, when a digitally signed document is under dispute, how can the group’s 
manager find out the identity of the original group member who signed the document, 
if necessary for an investigation? Third, how can we prove that the signature is indeed 
forged following an external attack from a supercomputer? Soon, in a future paper, we 
will extend this work to make the scheme even more effective. Following an attack, 
the signature could be proved to be forged without the need to expose the key. 
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1. Introduction 
 
More and more people and organizations are starting to use electronic documents 
to conduct official government and private business instead of using paper documents. 
Among other things, this benefits the environment by reducing the use of paper. It 
also increases the importance of using digital signatures to guarantee the validity, 
authenticity and integrity of electronic documents and reducing the risk of those 
documents being forged. 
 
In order to cope with the wide range of potential uses for digital signature 
technology, the concept of group signing was born. Let’s take a real-life example to 
explain the process of using a Group Signature Scheme: The chief of Taiwan’s 
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Environmental Protection Administration, along with 19 other staff members of the 
agency, are eligible to digitally sign documents, including those accusing a 
subordinate unit of breaking the law. In order to safeguard the agency members’ 
neutrality and protect them from interference, each staffer would activate a digital 
signature key when they release a statement or document representing the 
administration. The recipient of the document would be able to verify the authenticity 
of the digital signature, but in the event someone impeached the integrity or validity 
of a digitally signed document, the identity of the individual who originally signed the 
document would remain secret. 
 
Companies or other entities cited for violations by the Environmental Protection 
Administration could file a complaint with the agency to deny that they had violated 
the law. As part of the review process, it might be necessary to find out the identity of 
the official who signed the original document making the accusation. Only the 
manager in the group would have the ability to find out who signed the document. 
The manager, however, would not have the ability to pretend to be any other group 
member in order to forge a digital signature. 
 
Chaum et al. [1] concluded that there are three properties of group signatures: (i) 
Only members of the group can sign messages. (ii) The recipient can verify that it is a 
valid group signature, but cannot discover which group member made the signature. 
(iii) If necessary, the signature can be “opened,” so that the person who signed the 
message is revealed. 
 
There are also some favorable features of a group signature scheme that can 
applied in a range of fields. A digital signature can ensure the validity and authenticity 
of electronic documents. If the possibility of a document being forged could be 
reduced, or even if it were proved that the digital signature was indeed forged, the 
security level of the digital signature could then be enhanced. As for the application of 
digital signatures, there is another type of fail-stop signature scheme, or “FSS,” which 
can satisfy the above needs. 
 
Research by Nobuaki et al. [2] showed that a FSS scheme has to have at least two 
security properties: (i) A scheme based on information-theoretic security is secure 
even against a computationally-unbounded adversary. (ii) If the computational 
assumption is broken; an honest signer can prove a forgery by virtue of the 
information-theoretic security. 
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In this work, a FSGSS is proposed. FSGSS combines all of the functions and 
features of two schemes: Group Signature (GS) and a Fail-Stop Signature scheme 
(FSS). 
 
The layout of this paper is as follows: Section 2 is related work. Section 3 is our 
scheme. Section 4 provides analysis and discussion. And finally, Section 5 concludes 
the paper and provides a direction for future research. 
 
2. Related work 
 
Desmedt proposed the Group-Oriented Cryptosystem concept in 1987. In his 
research [3], he pointed out that in addition to entities that exist as individuals, there 
are entities consisting of groups of many individuals, such as hospitals, schools, 
public institutions and private companies. When these entities issue signed electronic 
documents, such as certificates, the concept of a digital signature becomes a 
mechanism to replace signatures on paper documents. The digital signatures could be 
placed on electronic diplomas, electronic medical records and other official 
documents released by governmental agencies. The types of documents that carry 
digital signatures must have the following features: certainty of identity, 
nonrepudiation and unforgeability. 
 
So the design of the way keys are exchanged and the parameters of the exchanges 
become particularly important. Although each member in a group has a secret key, the 
group password must be reused. In other words, individuals in the group cannot 
exchange their keys during an operation. Instead, they exchange secondary keys 
derived from their main keys. This ensures the security of the main keys. In addition, 
members cannot export the group’s master key in order to ensure that this key is kept 
secure. Jonathan et al. [4] developed a new and faster anonymous digital signature 
system by linking the LUC function with the complexities of discrete logarithm and 
factorization. 
 
On other hand, a lot of research has focused on the security of ordinary digital 
signature schemes that rely on a computational assumption. Fail-Stop Signature 
schemes provide security for a sender against a forger with unlimited computational 
power by enabling the sender to provide a proof of forgery if it occurs. FSS schemes 
have been proposed [2][5][6][7]. Kai et al. [8] proposed that a fail-stop scheme could 
assert a victim's innocence without exposing the n = p × q secret and would guard 
against malicious behavior. And more recently, Takashi N. et al. [9] proposed a 
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framework for FSS operating in a multisigner setting and called for a primitive 
fail-stop multisignature scheme (FSMS). In other words, they combine threshold 
[10][11] and fail-stop signatures. After the first aggregate signature scheme was 
proposed, many researchers have tried to propose an efficient aggregate signature 
scheme. 
FSS provides the security for a signer against a computationally unbounded 
adversary by enabling the signer to provide a proof of forgery. A conventional GS 
scheme has none of these properties. In this work, we propose a new scheme for 
integrating FSS and GS in the next section.  
 
3. Proposed scheme 
3-1 Initialization 
System Center (SC) chooses a primitive 𝑝0, satisfies the below equation. 
𝑝0 = 4𝑝1𝑞1 + 1 (1)  
Where 𝑝1,𝑞1 are large primitive, 
Let 𝑛 = 𝑝1𝑞1 (2)  
SC chooses a number, 𝑔2 ∈ Z𝑛
∗  satisfies 
𝑔2
𝑝1 ≡ 1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) (3)  
{𝑔2, 𝑝0, 𝑛}, {𝑝1, 𝑞1} is the public key and secret key of SC, respectively. The 
detail of initialization process shown in Fig.1  
 
Fig.1  Initialization of GFSS 
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3-2 Group and its members 
Without loss of generality, we assume that a group and its members 𝑢𝑖 , 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤
𝑙, where 𝑢0 is manager of group. The member registers to SC as follows 
individually： 
𝑢𝑖  chooses a number 𝑥𝑖, and calculates 
𝑔2
𝑥𝑖 ≡ 𝑦𝑖  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) (4)  
iu uses the 𝑦𝑖 to register. 
3-3 Parameters exchange 
I. 𝑢𝑖 , 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙, requests a part of parameter from 𝑢0. Then 𝑢0 chooses a 
number 𝑘 , and calculates 
𝑔2
𝑘 ≡ 𝑟1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) (5)  
𝑢0 → 𝑢𝑖 ∶  𝑟1  
(It means 𝑢0 send 𝑟1 to 𝑢𝑖) 
 
(6)  
𝑢𝑖  chooses a number 𝑏
′, and calculates 
𝑔2
𝑏′ ≡ 𝑏 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) (7)  
𝑟1
𝑏 ≡ 𝑟3 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) (8)  
𝑟2 ≡ 𝑟3/𝑏 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) (9)  
𝑢𝑖 → 𝑢𝑜 ∶  𝑟2 (10) 
𝑢0 chooses a number 𝑎, and satisfying the following equation. 
𝑎 ≡ 𝑥0𝑟2 + 𝑘𝑠 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) (11) 
𝑢0 → 𝑢𝑖 ∶ 𝑎, 𝑠 (After the above procedure, 
the manager 𝑢0 knew the parameters, 
𝑘, 𝑎, 𝑥0, 𝑟2, 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑠 𝑖𝑠 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤) 
(12) 
 
Note that 𝑦0, 𝑟1is public key of 𝑢0, where 𝑔2
𝑥0 ≡ 𝑦0  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0), by the 
equation (4). The detail process of GFSS is shown in Fig.2 3-way handshake for 
exchange parameters. 
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Fig.2  3-way handshake for parameters exchange 
 
3-4  𝑢𝑖  Signing a message 𝑚 
Multiply 𝑏 on the 2 sides of the equation (11) and hence,  
𝑏𝑎 ≡ 𝑥0(𝑏𝑟2) + (𝑘𝑏)𝑠  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) (13) 
   Multiply 𝑏 on the 2 sides of the equation (9) and hence, 
𝑟3 ≡ 𝑏𝑟2  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) (14) 
   By equation (13) and (14), we have,  
𝑏𝑎 ≡ 𝑥0𝑟3 + (𝑘𝑏)𝑠  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) (15) 
chooses 2 numbers c, e and calculates 
𝑔2
𝑐 ≡ 𝑟5  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) (16) 
𝑔2
𝑒 ≡ 𝐸  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) (17) 
Let 𝑟4 ≡ 𝑟3𝑟5  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) (18) 
and 𝑠1 ≡ 𝑟5s  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 n) 
(19) 
Add 𝑐𝑠 on the 2 sides of the equation (15) and hence, 
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𝑏𝑎 + 𝑐𝑠 ≡  𝑥0𝑟3 + (𝑘𝑏)𝑠 + 𝑐𝑠
≡ 𝑥0𝑟3 + (𝑘𝑏 + 𝑐)𝑠  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) 
(20) 
Using 𝑟5 in equation (18) and equation (19) to multiply 2 sides of the 
equation (20) and hence,  
(𝑏𝑎 + 𝑐𝑠)𝑟5 ≡ 𝑥0 (
𝑟4
𝑟5
) 𝑟5 + (𝑘𝑏 + 𝑐) (
𝑠1
𝑟5
) 𝑟5
≡ 𝑥0𝑟4 + (𝑘𝑏 + 𝑐)𝑠1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) 
(21) 
Let 𝑟6 = (𝑏𝑎 + 𝑐𝑠)𝑟5  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) (22) 
and 𝑚 + 𝑟6 = 𝑐𝐸 + 𝑒𝑠2  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) (23) 
We assume that the recipient of the message is 𝑅, 𝑢𝑖  sends messages to 𝑅. 
We note that, 
𝑢𝑖 → 𝑅 ∶ {𝑚, 𝑐, 𝐸, 𝑟4, 𝑟6, 𝑠1, 𝑠2} (24) 
 
𝑅 calculate the equations as follows. 
𝑔2
𝑟6 ≡ 𝑦0
𝑟4𝑟4
𝑠1   (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) (25) 
𝑔2
𝑚+𝑟6 = 𝑔2
𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑠2   (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) (26) 
Recipient accepted this digital signature if both equations above are valid. 
Otherwise, deny this digital signature. 
 
Table 1. A list of members holding parameters 
 SC 𝑢𝑜 𝑢𝑖  𝑅     SC 𝑢𝑜 𝑢𝑖  𝑅 
𝑔2 v v v v 𝑎  v v  
𝑝𝑜 v v v v 𝑠  v v  
𝑛 v v v v 𝑚   v v 
𝑦𝑖 v v v  𝑐   v v 
𝑟1  v v  𝐸   v v 
𝑘  v   𝑟4   v v 
𝑏′   v  𝑟6   v v 
𝑏   v  𝑠1   v v 
𝑟2  v v  𝑠2   v v 
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4 Analysis and discussion 
In this section, first we introduce Lemma 1 to check whether a digital signature is 
valid or not. Lemma 2 verifies whether a digital signature is activated by the group 
member. Lemma 3 shows the attack method that is mentioned by Willy Susilo et al. [7] 
will not succeed. There are a lot of parameters after these procedures above. We make 
a list of members holding parameters as Table 1. In this scheme, members share the 
partial parameters and keep a few parameter(s). For example, manager 𝑢0 only holds 
the parameter 𝑘, and a member 𝑢𝑖  only holds the parameter 𝑏. In case someone 
makes a digital signature of 𝑢0 and it is verified but she/he has no idea about 𝑏, that 
means someone is a forger.  
 
Lemma 1 Assumes that 𝑢0, 𝑢𝑖 are honest, if both equations (25) and (26) are 
valid, then the digital signature is correct. 
Proof: 
By the equation (22), we have 
𝑔2
𝑟6 ≡ 𝑔2
(𝑏𝑎+𝑐𝑠)𝑟5 ≡ 𝑔2
𝑥0𝑟4+(𝑘𝑏+𝑐)𝑠1
≡ 𝑔2
𝑥0𝑟4𝑔2
(𝑘𝑏+𝑐)𝑠1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) 
(27) 
There are 2 parts in last term of the equations above, consider that the first 
part, by equation (4) that we have 
𝑔2
𝑥0𝑟4 ≡ (𝑔2
𝑥0)𝑟4 ≡ 𝑦0
𝑟4   (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) (28) 
Consider that the second part,  
𝑔2
(𝑘𝑏+𝑐)𝑠1 ≡ 𝑔2
(𝑘𝑏)𝑠1𝑔2
𝑐𝑠1 ≡ ((𝑔2
𝑘)
𝑏
)
𝑠1
𝑔2
𝑐𝑠1 
≡ ((𝑟1)
𝑏)𝑠1𝑔2
𝑐𝑠1, by the equation (5). 
(29) 
≡ 𝑟1
𝑏𝑠1(𝑔2
𝑐)𝑠1 ≡ 𝑟1
𝑏𝑠1𝑟5
𝑠1, by the equation (17). 
≡ 𝑟3
𝑠1𝑟5
𝑠1 ≡ (𝑟3𝑟5)
𝑠1, by the equation (8). 
≡ 𝑟4
𝑠1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛), by the equation (18). 
Combine these equations (28) and (29), we obtain 
𝑔2
𝑟6 ≡ 𝑦0
𝑟4𝑟4
𝑠1   (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛)  
and hence,  
𝑔2
𝑚+𝑟6 = 𝑔2
𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑠2   (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0)  
Therefore, both equations (25) and (26) are valid.  
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When we want to check if the message 𝑚 has been sent by 𝑢𝑖  or not. It needs 
some parameters. And hence we obtain the following Lemma. 
 
Lemma 2 Assumes that 𝑢0, 𝑢𝑖  are honest, only 𝑢0 can prove the 
message 𝑚 was sent from 𝑢𝑖  by the equation (8). 
Proof: 
Note that, 
(a) 𝑟1
𝑏 ≡ 𝑟3  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) from the equation (8)  
(b) 𝑢𝑖 → 𝑅 ∶ {𝑚, 𝑐, 𝐸, 𝑟4, 𝑟6, 𝑠1, 𝑠2} from the equation (24). 
(c) 𝑢0 → 𝑢𝑖 ∶  𝑎, 𝑠 from the equation (12). 
(d) 𝑟4 ≡ 𝑟3𝑟5  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) from the equation (18). 
(e) 𝑏𝑎 ≡ 𝑥0𝑟3 + (𝑘𝑏)𝑠  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) from the equation (15). 
(f) 𝑔2
𝑘 ≡ 𝑟1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) form the equation (5). 
(g) 𝑔2
𝑟6 ≡ 𝑦0
𝑟4𝑟4
𝑠1   (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) from the equation (25). 
(h) 𝑔2
𝑚+𝑟6 = 𝑔2
𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑠2   (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) from the equation (26). 
 
Consider that the equation (19) 𝑠1 ≡ 𝑟5s (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛), we knew 𝑠1, 𝑠 because of 
the equations (24) and (12). Hence, we can get 𝑟5 and hence we can get 𝑟3 by 
means of the equations (24) and (18). Finally, we must compute 𝑏 (just 𝑢𝑖  knew 
this parameter) because 𝑢0 has no idea about 𝑏. 
 
Consider that the equation (15), 𝑎, 𝑥0, 𝑟3, 𝑘 and 𝑠 is known. It is not easy to 
get 𝑏 by other people, except the manager of group 𝑢0. Actually, it is a Discrete 
Logarithm Problem (DLP), when someone just knows 𝑟1, 𝑟3 by the equation (8). 
 
We conclude that  𝑢0 can get  𝑏,  because he has known already a part of 
parameters from 𝑢𝑖  and he has his own parameter 𝑘. Therefore, after check the 
equations (25) and (26), we can to say, the message is send by 𝑢𝑖  exactly.  
 
Lemma 3 An attacker intercepts the message passed by the digital signature 
adapting the method of Willy Susilo. It will not succeed. 
Proof: 
Note that,  
(a) 𝑢𝑖 → 𝑅 ∶ {𝑚, 𝑐, 𝐸, 𝑟4, 𝑟6, 𝑠1, 𝑠2} from the equation (24). 
(b) 𝑔2
𝑟6 ≡ 𝑦0
𝑟4𝑟4
𝑠1   (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) from the equation (25). 
(c) 𝑔2
𝑚+𝑟6 = 𝑔2
𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑠2   (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) from the equation (26). 
 
Assume that an attacker A intercepts the message as the equation (24) shows. 
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Due to A having no idea about the parameters 𝑥0, 𝑟4, then we assume,  
𝑔2
𝑥0
′
≡ 𝑦0  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) 
(30) 
𝑔2
𝑟4
′
≡ 𝑟4  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝0) 
(31) 
A can easily forge  𝑚∗ for suitable parameters {𝑐′, 𝐸′, 𝑠2
′ }  such that both 
equations (25) and (26) are valid. In other words, the digital signature passes the test 
of Lemma 2. After the procedure of Lemma 2 and hence, a non-trivial factor 
of  𝑛 can be found by computing 𝐺𝐶𝐷(𝑏, 𝑏∗, 𝑛).  We note that the probability 
of 𝑏 being equal to 𝑏∗ is 1/𝑞0. Therefore, it is proved that the 𝑚
∗ is not sent by 
the member of group.  
 
5 Conclusion and future work 
In this paper, we propose a novel FSGS scheme. This scheme integrates the 
features of two types of digital signatures, which strengthens its security level under 
the group-signature system. It ensures that group members can prove that a digital 
signature is indeed a forgery after supercomputer forgery attacks. In addition to the 
technology of integrating two digital signatures, this work also contributes three 
proposed lemmas and proves that they are indeed feasible. Lemma 1 is a method to 
verify a FSGSS digital signature. Lemma 2 is used by the group manager, when 
needed, to determine the identity of the group member originally creating a digital 
signature. Finally, this paper proposes Lemma 3. When the digital signature is found 
to be forged, members of the group can prove this fact.  
In addition, the ultimate goal of the FSGSS is to stop using the same key 
immediately after the discovery of a forgery attack to avoid the same attack happening 
again. That is, the “key” used in this paper is the parameter 𝑏 used by 𝑢𝑖. If we need 
to change the parameters each time after an attack, the process of replacing the 
parameters is equivalent to re-executing the exchange parameter program. Therefore, 
in future work, if we cannot directly expose the key 𝑏, we could still prove that a 
certain number of signatures are forged, which would enhance the efficiency of the 
GFSS scheme. 
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